This article explores the risk and return relationship of active portfolios subject to a constraint on tracking-error volatility (TEV), which can also be interpreted in terms of value at risk. Such a constrained portfolio is the typical setup for active managers who are given the task of beating a benchmark. The problem with this setup is that the portfolio manager pays no attention to total portfolio risk, which results in seriously inefficient portfolios unless some additional constraints are imposed. The development in this article shows that TEV-constrained portfolios are described by an ellipse on the traditional mean-variance plane. This finding yields a number of new insights. Because of theflat shape of this ellipse, adding a constraint on total portfolio volatility can substantially improve the performance of the active portfolio. In general, plan sponsors should concentrate on controlling total portfolio risk. n typical portfolio delegation, the investor I assigns the management of assets to a portfolio manager who is given the task of beating a benchmark. When the investor observes outperformance by the active portfolio, the issue is whether the added. value is in line with the risks undertaken. This issue is particularly important when performance fees are involved. Performance fees induce an option-like pattern in. the compensation of the manager, who may have an incentive to take on more risk to increase the value of the option.' To control this behavior, institutional investors commonly impose a limit on the volatility of the deviation of the active portfolio from the benchmark, which is also known as tracking-error volatility (TEV).
n typical portfolio delegation, the investor I assigns the management of assets to a portfolio manager who is given the task of beating a benchmark. When the investor observes outperformance by the active portfolio, the issue is whether the added. value is in line with the risks undertaken. This issue is particularly important when performance fees are involved. Performance fees induce an option-like pattern in. the compensation of the manager, who may have an incentive to take on more risk to increase the value of the option.' To control this behavior, institutional investors commonly impose a limit on the volatility of the deviation of the active portfolio from the benchmark, which is also known as tracking-error volatility (TEV).
The problem with this setup is that it induces the manager to optimize in only excess-return space while totally ignoring the investor's overall portfolio risk. In an insightful paper, Roll (1992) noted that excess-return optimization leads to the unpalatable result that the active portfolio has systematically higher risk than the benchmark and is not optimal. Jorion (2002) examined a sample of enhanced index funds, which are likely to go through a formal excess-return optimization, and found that such funds have systematically greater risk than the benchmark. Thus, the agency problem is real.
Given these problems, why does the industry maintain this widespread emphasis on controlling tracking-error risk?2 Roll conjectured that diversifying among managers could mitigate the inherent flaw in TEV optimization, but as I will show later, it does not.
In this article, I investigate whether the agency problem can be corrected with additional restrictions on the active portfolio without eliminating the usual TEV constraint. Thus, because the TEV constraint is so widely used in practice, I take the TEV constraint as given, even though this restriction is not optimal. I derive the constant-TEV frontier in the original mean-variance space.
Traditionally, TEV has been checked after the fact (i.e., from the volatility of historical excess returns), but recently, forward-looking measures of risk, such as value at risk (VAR), have allowed the forecasting of TEV.3 The essence of VAR is to measure the downside loss for current portfolio positions based on the best risk forecast. With a distributional assumption for portfolio returns, excess-return VAR is equivalent to a forwardlooking measure of TEV. Nowadays, VAR limits are commonly used to ensure that the active portfolio does not stray too far from the benchmark.4 In addition, pension funds are increasingly allocating their risk through the use of "risk budgets," which can be defined as the conversion of optimal meanvariance allocations to VAR assignments for active managers.5 Philippe Jorion is professor offinance at the University of California at Irvine.
In this section, I review optimization results for the efficient frontiers in absolute and relative spaces.
Setup. Consider a portfolio manager who is given the task of beating an index or benchmark. For this task, the manager must take positions in the assets within the index and, perhaps, other assets. The manager goes about this task as follows.
Define the following variables: q = vector of index weights for the sample of N assets x = vector of deviations from the index qp = q + x = vector of portfolio weights E = vector of expected returns V = covariance matrix for asset returns To preserve linearity, assume that net short sales are allowed (i.e., total active weight qi + xi can be negative for any asset i). Otherwise, the problem generalizes to a quadratic optimization for which there is no closed-form solution.
In practice, the benchmark has positive weight qi. Generally, it can have negative or zero weights on assets. Thus, the universe of assets can exceed the components of the index. This optimization, however, must include the assets in the benchmark.
Expected returns and variances can now be written in matrix notation as 
The investment problem is subject to a constraint that the portfolio be fully invested-that is, total portfolio weights (q + x) must add up to unity. This constraint can be written as
with 1 representing a vector of l's. Because the benchmark weights also add up to unity, the portfolio deviations must add up to zero, which implies that x'l is zero. Thus, the active portfolio can be constructed as a position in the index plus a "hedge fund," with positive and negative positions that represent active views. 
where UMV iS the expected return of the global minimum-variance portfolio. Roll noted that this solution is totally independent of the benchmark because it does not involve q. The unexpected result is that active managers pay no attention to the benchmark.7 In other words, given 5,000 U.S. stocks to choose from, the portfolio manager will take the same active bets whether the index is the S&P 500 or the Russell 2000. This result has major consequences because such behavior is not optimal for the investor. In mean-volatility space for excess returns, the (upper) efficient frontier is (6) which is linear in tracking-error volatility, TEV = a = fT, as shown in Figure 1 .8 The benchmark is on the vertical axis because it has zero tracking error. If the manager is measured solely in terms of excess-return performance, he or she should pick a point on the upper part of this efficient frontier. For instance, the manager may have a utility function that balances expected value added against tracking-error volatility. Note that because the efficient set consists of a straight line, the maximal Sharpe ratio is not a usable criterion for portfolio allocation.
In practice, expected returns are neither observable nor verifiable by the investor. Instead, the portfolio manager is given a constraint on tracking-error volatility, which determines the optimal allocation. This allocation is represented by the intersection of the efficient set with the vertical line representing a constant a,=. Figure 1 shows The graph in Figure 2 shows an unintended effect of TE optimization: Instead of moving toward the true efficient frontier (i.e., up and to the left of the benchmark), the TE frontier moves up and to the right. This outcome increases the total volatility of the portfolio, which is a direct result of focusing myopically on excess returns instead of total returns. The expected return of Portfolio MV is less than that of the benchmark, which should be the case. Otherwise, the index would be grossly inefficient.
Portfolio E is defined as the portfolio on the efficient frontier with the same level of risk as the benchmark (i.e., 14.1 percent). The Portfolio E numbers are typical of the expected performance of active managers because they are based on an information ratio of Jd = 0.50.
Focus now on Portfolio P with 4 percent tracking risk. Part of the 200 bps increase in expected return of this portfolio relative to the benchmark is illusory because it reflects the higher risk of Portfolio P. To illustrate this point, Figure 2 shows a leveraged portfolio, Portfolio L, achieved with, for instance, stock index futures in such a way that its total risk is also 15.4 percent. Portfolio L is 60 bps above the benchmark-a nonnegligible fraction of the excess performance of 200 bps. So, Figure 2 illustrates the general point that part of the value added of this TEV portfolio is fallacious. The TEV optimization creates an increase in the fund's risk.
Value of Diversification among Managers
Roll conjectured that this increase in risk could be mitigated by diversifying among active managers. Does diversification among managers pay? If the portfolio is equally invested in N managers, the total return on the portfolio, RP, is given by the return on the benchmark, RB, plus the average of the active excess returns, RE i: 
The variance term decreases with more managers or lower correlations. Figure 3 shows, however, that with realistic data, the rate of decrease is 
Constant-TEV Frontier
Now that I have shown the drawbacks of TEV optimization, the issue is whether additional constraints can be used to improve the performance of TEV-constrained portfolios. The first step is to characterize the locus of points that correspond to a TEV constraint in the original MV space. The optimization can be written as The relationship between expected return and variance for a fixed TEV turns out to be an ellipseEquation C6 in Appendix C. The ellipse is somewhat distorted in (a, ~t) space and is illustrated in Figure 4 . Next, Figure 5 shows the effect of changing TEV on this frontier. When GE is zero, the ellipse collapses to a single point, the benchmark. As a6 increases, the size of the ellipse increases. The left side of the ellipse moves to the left and becomes tangent to the efficient-set parabola at one point.
The first tangency occurs at c = VA2 -A/d = 11.5%. After that point, two tangency points occur. As a E increases, the ellipse moves to the right. For cGE = 2 2 -A1/d = 23.0%, the ellipse passes through the index itself. All active portfolios with TEV constraints and positive excess returns must have greater risk than the index.
These analytical results, proved in Appendix C, show that tracking-error volatility should be chosen carefully. If TEV values are set too high, maintaining a level of risk similar to that of the benchmark is impossible.
Following these results, the next question is whether the investor might be able to induce the active manager to move closer to the efficient frontier by imposing additional constraints.
Moving Closer to the Efficient Frontier
Could imposing additional restrictions on the active manager bring the portfolio closer to the efficient frontier?
Risk-Return Trade-Off. One solution would be for the investor to provide a manager with the investor's risk-return trade-off. The manager would then optimize the investor's utility subject to the TEV constraint. For instance, the problem can be set up as follows: 
where t is the investor's risk tolerance subject to the TEV constraint. The problem with this approach is that it is impractical to verify. Ex ante, the manager may not be willing to disclose expected returns. Ex post, realized returns are enormously noisy measures of expected returns. Instead, it is much easier to constrain the risk profile, either before or after the fact-which is no doubt why investors give managers tracking-error constraints.
Armed with the equation for a constant-TEV frontier (Equation C6), we can now explore the effectiveness of imposing additional restrictions. One such constraint, explored by Roll, is to impose a beta of 1. But we can do even more.
Constraint on Total Risk. The investor could specify that the portfolio risk be equal to that of the index itself: Figure 5 shows that when TEV is about 12 percent, such a constraint on absolute volatility can bring the portfolio much closer to the efficient set. Imposing an additional restriction on the manager, however, must decrease expected returns. The cost can be derived from Equation C16 in Appendix C. The issue is whether this restriction is really harmful.
The shape of the constant-TEV frontier in Figure 4 suggests that the loss from this restriction may not be large. The top part of the ellipse is rather flat. The effects of a constraint on total volatility are illustrated in Table 2 , which reports the drop in expected return and the associated reduction in volatility for various levels of aMv and of A1. The ratio of the drop in pt to that in a can be viewed as the cost of the constraint. Table 2 shows that when A1 = 0 percent (that is, MB = !Mv) aMV = 8 percent, and the TEV is set at 4 percent, imposing a constraint on total volatility leads to a loss of expected return of only 0.03 percentage point (pp). The risk reduction gained in exchange is 0.57 pps, so the ratio is 0.06. When A1 = 2 percent and other settings are the same as previously, the loss of expected return is 0.29 pps in exchange for a risk reduction of 1.65 pps, for a ratio of 0.18.
These return-to-risk ratios compare favorably with an intrinsic information ratio (return-to-risk) of 0.50. Thus, the cost of the additional constraint on total volatility is low.
The conditions under which this constraint is most useful can also be identified from Table 2 . The conditions depend on the size of the tracking-error constraint and the efficiency of the benchmark. First, the lower the TEV, the more helpful the constraint. Indeed, the ratio of the drop in expected return to drop in volatility decreases as one moves from the right of the table to the left. Second, the less efficient the index, the better the constraint. The cost of the constraint decreases when A1 = MB -WMV is low, which means that the expected return on the index is low. The cost also decreases when aMV is low relative to aB, which means that the risk of the index is large relative to the efficient frontier.
Hence, imposing a constraint on the total risk appears sensible precisely in situations where the benchmark is relatively inefficient. If the active manager is confident that he or she can add value, the manager should easily accept an additional constraint on total portfolio risk.
Illustration of Portfolio Positions. The results obtained so far depend only on the efficientset parameters and the characteristics of the benchmark. They hold for any number of assets. Table 3 shows how these numbers could be achieved with hypothetical expected returns for the four global equity markets and the Lehman Brothers U.S. bond index. Table 3 reports expected returns and positions for three portfolios-the benchmark, the 4 percent TEV-constrained active portfolio, and the portfolio with an additional constraint that the total risk must equal that of the benchmark.
The information ratio of 0.5 was driven primarily by the dispersion in expected returns, as shown in that column. I chose high expected returns for German and U.K. equities, moderate returns for U.S. equities, and low expected returns for Japanese equities. I set the expected return from U.S. bonds at 8 percent. The next column shows the positions for the benchmark; these weights correspond to those in the global stock index in 2000. As before, the index is expected to return 10 percent.
The next two columns display positions in the usual TEV-constrained portfolio. To increase returns, the active manager increases the position in German and U.K. equities and decreases the position in Japanese equities, U.S. equities, and bonds. This move increases the expected return by 200 bps. But, unfortunately, the total risk also increases-from 13.8 percent to 15.4 percent.
The last two columns report positions for the TEV-constrained portfolio with an additional constraint on total risk. This portfolio does indeed have lower volatility than the TEV-constrained portfolio; in fact, its total risk is 13.8 percent, equal to that of the benchmark. The most interesting aspect of the table, however, is that achieving this reduction in risk comes at a very low cost: The expected return is only marginally lower than it was before adding risk control (i.e., 11.8 percent instead of 12 percent). The strategy to achieve this outcome was to short more U.S. equities and move the proceeds into U.S. bonds with their low total risk.
Thus, adding a constraint on total risk preserves most of the benefits of active management while it remedies the inherent flaw in excess-return optimization.
Conclusions
The common practice in the investment management industry is to control the risk of active managers by imposing a constraint on tracking error. This setup, however, is seriously inefficient. When myopically focusing on excess returns, the active manager ignores the total risk of the portfolio. As a result, optimization of excess returns that includes the benchmark assets will always increase total portfolio risk relative to the benchmark. This outcome is reinforced by the widespread use of information ratios as performance measures. Because information ratios consider only trackingerror risk, a focus on information ratios ignores total portfolio risk.
This issue has major consequences for performance measurement: Part of the value added by active managers acting in this fashion is illusory; it could be naively obtained by leveraging up the benchmark.
Because the industry continues to emphasize tracking-error constraints and information ratios, I considered in this article what can be done to mitigate the inefficiency of using TEV constraints. I derived analytical solutions for the risk-return relationship of portfolios subject to a TEV constraint. And I showed that the constraint is described by an ellipse in the usual mean-variance space. This finding allowed exploration of the effect of imposing additional constraints on the active manager.
The simplest constraint is to force total portfolio volatility to be no greater than that of the benchmark. With the advent of forward-looking risk measures, such as VAR, such a constraint is easy to set up. I showed that because of the flat shape of the ellipse, adding such a constraint can substantially improve the performance of the active portfolio. 
Appendix B. Tracking-Error Frontier
This discussion presents the derivation of the shape of the tracking-error frontier in the excess meanvariance space (i.e., relative to a benchmark).
One must assume that the benchmark is not on the efficient set; otherwise, there would be no rationale for active management. In addition, the expected return on the benchmark is assumed to be greater than or equal to that of the minimumvariance portfolio: [B 2 gMV = b/c. If this condition were not satisfied, the benchmark would be grossly inefficient because the investor could pick another index with the same risk but higher expected return.
Consider a maximization of portfolio excess return over the deviations x from the benchmark: Finally, the fourth part of Theorem 2 (which concerns benchmark risk and the TEV frontier) is as follows:
Theorem 2d: When cE = 2 FA2, the constantTEVfrontier achieves a minimum level of risk equal to that of the benchmark. Above this value, any constant-TEV portfolio has risk greater than that of the benchmark.
Increasing T further moves the ellipse back to the right. In particular, when controlled by the investment manager. After all, the manager should already have in place a risk measurement system that gives the tracking error of the active portfolio. The manager should also have the best understanding of the instruments in the portfolio. Thomas (2000) argued, however, that this delegation of risk control to the manager creates a conflict of interest for the manager and that risk control is best performed by a disinterested party. 5. For an introduction to risk budgeting, see Chow and Kritzman (2001). Lucas and Klaassen (1998) also discuss the link between portfolio optimization and VAR. 6. The closest paper is that of Leibowitz, Kogelman, and Bader (1992), who discussed the application of the shortfall approach to portfolio choice for a pension fund. In their case, the tracking-error volatility was replaced by "surplus return," which was defined relative to the liabilities. Their paper entailed another constraint, however-a linear relationship between expected returns and volatility-and involved a simple setup with only two risky assets. In addition, Leibowitz et al. presented no closed-form solutions. Chow (1995) argued that the objective function should account for total risk but also tracking-error risk. Rudolf, Wolter, and Zimmermann (1999) compared various linear models to minimize tracking error. Ammann and Zimmermann (2001) examined the relationship between limits on TEV and deviations from benchmark weights. 7. In practice, the active positions will depend on the benchmark if the mandate has short-selling restrictions on total weights. Assets with low expected returns can be shorted only up to the extent of the (long) position in the benchmark. 8. With restrictions that the total portfolio weights cannot be negative, qi + xi ? 0, the efficient frontier starts as a straight line, then becomes concave as some of the restrictions become binding, xi = -qi. It then flattens out until the whole active portfolio is invested in the asset with the highest expected return. 9. In practice, substantial estimation error in expected returns can result when estimates are based on historical data. Therefore, I did not use historical data but, instead, adjusted expected returns to achieve a "reasonable" information ratio. As Michaud (1989) showed, the optimal portfolio is quite sensitive to errors in expected returns. Jorion (1992) showed that when data are taken from historical observations, the variability in the weights can be gauged from simulations based on the original sample. In contrast, the covariance matrix can be more precisely estimated. Chan, Karceski, and Lakonishok (1999) showed that for optimization purposes, the covariance matrix contains substantial predictability. 10. For instance, ABP, the Dutch pension plan that has $140 billion in assets and that currently ranks as the world's second largest pension fund, assigns total risk limits to its active managers. 11. A general quartic equation (also called a "biquadratic equation") is a fourth-order polynomial of the form: z4 + a3z3 + a2z2 + alz + aO = 0.
